Description

In Ethereum, users pay fees to get their transactions on-chain. The amount of fees they pay and how these fees are distributed are determined by a transaction fee mechanism (TFM). Ethereum currently uses the TFM proposed in EIP-1559, which is characterized by improved user experience, incentive compatibility for myopic block producers, and resistance to out-of-band agreements between users and block producers. FOCIL provides a new way for transactions to go on-chain. Can FOCIL be enhanced with a TFM? If so, what are the explicit goals the TFM should optimize for?

Questions

• Should there be a separate fee for inclusion in the inclusion list?
• What should be the goals of a FOCIL TFM design?
• Can these goals be reached simultaneously?
• How do the properties of inclusion lists, like conditional or unconditional, affect the TFM?
• Would FOCIL benefit from a conditional tip?

Resources

• Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for the Ethereum Blockchain: An Economic Analysis of EIP-1559, Tim Roughgarden

  https://timroughgarden.org/papers/eip1559.pdf

• Censorship Resistance in On-Chain Auctions, Elijah Fox, Mallesh Pai, Max Resnick

  https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.13321